Tampoco me parece una idea brillante: el periódico personalizado (de verdad) ni siquiera es Prismatic, es Google Reader y nadie se atreve a ganar pasta reciclando contenidos de otros (ah, la propiedad intelectual). Para Facebook es mejor ser otra cosa, aunque sea un pozo de memes.
http://www.error500.net/el-contexto-d...eriodico-personalizado/#comment-31317
"Because despite all their posturing, Facebook is terrible at providing context and surfacing ads that make sense. But if they start surfacing similar pointless and terrible ads in the main feed (like all those stupid paid-shares by my friends) then this grand experiment to make more money is going to backfire."
"It is also a tactical admission (though a silent one) about their limitations in providing context and creating a new advertising model."
"It is also a tactical admission (though a silent one) about their limitations in providing context and creating a new advertising model."
http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/OmMalik/~3/QpOfzOvBH08/story01.htm
No va a ser en 2013 ni probablemente el siguiente, pero si mi rol en la cadena de valor de la publicidad fuese el de prescribir donde poner banners y negociar precios, iría anotando que Amazon, Google y Facebook creen que ese trabajo lo van a hacer máquinas. Más concretamente, las suyas.
http://www.error500.net/si-amazon-ent...finitivamente-va-a-ser-cosa-de-robots
Linkedin tiene 3000 empleados.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersi...social-jobs-app-not-a-linkedin-killer
El coste de la intermediación a la que muchos se han sometido voluntariamente ya comienza a ser visible
http://inspirinas.com/lo-confieso-he-pagado-322-euros-para-que-mis
Pues sencillamente eso, facebook finalmente comienza a monetizar sus capacidad de dataminig invadiendo la privacidad de sus usuarios. Algo que se veía venir desde bien lejos.
http://www.technologyreview.com/view/...ring-what-it-knows-about-you/?ref=rss
In other words, when there appears to be "excess" demand for stock on the IPO, the lead underwriter has the ability to sell 15% more shares than it has already agreed to sell. In selling these shares, the bank takes a short position in the stock, by selling shares it doesn't yet own. If the bank were doing this as a "naked short"--selling shares it didn't have a right to buy later at a specific price--the bank would be taking huge risk: The stock might go up, forcing the bank to buy back stock to cover its short at a much higher price. But the "overallotment option" allows the bank to buy another 15% of shares from the company at the IPO price, thus allowing it to sell additional stock on the IPO without taking the risk that the stock might go up.
Importantly, the bank gets paid its full IPO commission on the extra shares it sells if exercises its option, so it has an incentive to sell them regardless of how much excess demand there is. And there's no risk to the bank if the stock price jumps, because the bank can cover its short buy buying the stock back at the IPO price.
And if the stock drops after the IPO?
Well, then the bank really cashes in.
Because then the bank makes money from:
- IPO commissions
- And proceeds from shorting the stock at the IPO price and then buying it back at a lower price.
And that's just what happened with Facebook.
With Facebook, we all remember, the underwriters "supported" the stock for the first day, helping it close just above the IPO price. Then the underwriters gave up on supporting it. And the stock has traded pretty much straight down from there.
And at some point, shortly after the IPO, the underwriters covered the short position they established by "over-allotting" Facebook stock on the IPO...and they covered at a lower price.
Importantly, the bank gets paid its full IPO commission on the extra shares it sells if exercises its option, so it has an incentive to sell them regardless of how much excess demand there is. And there's no risk to the bank if the stock price jumps, because the bank can cover its short buy buying the stock back at the IPO price.
And if the stock drops after the IPO?
Well, then the bank really cashes in.
Because then the bank makes money from:
- IPO commissions
- And proceeds from shorting the stock at the IPO price and then buying it back at a lower price.
And that's just what happened with Facebook.
With Facebook, we all remember, the underwriters "supported" the stock for the first day, helping it close just above the IPO price. Then the underwriters gave up on supporting it. And the stock has traded pretty much straight down from there.
And at some point, shortly after the IPO, the underwriters covered the short position they established by "over-allotting" Facebook stock on the IPO...and they covered at a lower price.
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebo...-shorting-facebooks-stock-2012-8?op=1
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http://www.ivanfanego.com/2012/08/zyn...sociales/comment-page-1/#comment-1120
Sigue la pelea entre G y Fbk. Con facebook metiendo la pata hasta el fondo. Increible y muy ilustrativo
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/...over-to-facebook-com-e-mail-addresses
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http://www.biankahajdu.com/2012/06/25...es-ahora-lo-que-antes-era-aol-o-terra
